Abstract-We study stochastic dynamic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. We consider mean field equilibrium for such games: in such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players. In this paper we focus on a special class of stochastic games, where a player experiences strategic complementarities from other players; formally the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the aggregate empirical distribution of the states of other players. We find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and "smallest" equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing. We also show that natural best response dynamics converge to each of these equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies dynamic interactions between multiple decision makers with strategic complementarities. A strategic complementarity exists, if, informally, "higher" actions by other players increase the return to higher actions for a given player. For example, consider online recommendation systems, such as those used by Netflix and Amazon. In such systems, if an individual puts forth greater effort in maintaining their profile, the recommendations they receive will improve. However, the recommendations other individuals receive improve as well, and typically other individuals will feel a stronger incentive to exert additional effort maintaining their profile in this case. A similar effect arises in online social networking sites such as Facebook. These are examples with positive network effects; games with strategic complementarities are commonly used to model settings with positive network effects. Strategic complementarities have been applied in a range of other game theoretic models as well, including search models, oligopoly models, and coordination games. This paper considers a class of models with strategic complementarities exhibiting two additional salient features. First, we consider models where the interactions are dynamic. Utility is modeled as the infinite horizon discounted payoff a player earns. Each player is described by a state; players can take actions (at some cost) to change their state at each time period, and a player's payoff each period is determined by the state vector of all players.
Second, we consider models where the number of players grows large; as a result, we consider an approximation methodology where agents optimize only with respect to long run average estimates of the distribution of other players' states, known as mean field equilibrium. Informally, if the number of agents grows large, then from the viewpoint of a single agent, tracking the individual state evolution of every player in the system may be excessively computationally and informationally complex. In mean field equilibrium, individuals postulate that fluctuations in the empirical distribution of other players' states have "averaged out" due to large scale, and thus optimize holding the state distribution of other players fixed. Mean field equilibrium requires a consistency check: the postulated state distribution must arise from the optimal strategies agents compute.
In this paper we study mean field equilibria of stochastic games with complementarities. We establish two main results. First, we show that under a parsimonious set of assumptions, mean field equilibria exist in games with strategic complementarities. Our approach is based on the use of lattice programming techniques. Lattice theoretic methods are typically applied in games with complementarities, though we note that existence of equilibria in our game cannot be inferred from existence results for other games in the literature. We also show that there exists a "largest" and "smallest" equilibrium among the set of all mean field equilibria with nondecreasing strategies, and that these equilibria may be reached via simple best response dynamics. In particular, if each agent starts at the lowest (resp., highest) possible state, and at each time step plays according to a particular optimal strategy assuming the state distribution of other players' is going to remain constant indefinitely, then the state distribution converges to the lowest (resp., highest) mean field equilibrium among all equilibria with nondecreasing strategies.
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